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Abstract—We propose and evaluate an immuno-inspired ap-
proach to misbehavior detection in ad hoc wireless networks.
Node misbehavior can be the result of an intrusion, or a software
or hardware failure. Our approach is motivated by co-stimulatory
signals present in the Biological immune system. The results
show that co-stimulation in ad hoc wireless networks can both
substantially improve energy efficiency of detection and, at the
same time, help achieve low false positives rates. The energy
efficiency improvement is almost two orders of magnitude, if
compared to misbehavior detection based on watchdogs.
We provide a characterization of the trade-offs between
detection approaches executed by a single node and by several
nodes in cooperation. Additionally, we investigate several feature
sets for misbehavior detection. These feature sets impose different
requirements on the detection system, most notably from the
energy efficiency point of view.
I. INTRODUCTION
Ad hoc wireless networks can be subject to a large variety of
attacks or intrusions. These attacks can range from a simple
packet dropping to advanced attacks executed in collusion,
possibly utilizing a superior computational platform than that
of the attacked network. It is an ambition of secure protocols
to prevent all or a majority of these attacks. Experience from
the Internet, however, points out that flaws in these protocols
are continuously being found and exploited [1].
Performance analysis of security and protection solutions
for ad hoc wireless networks received of a lot of interest from
the community; see [2], [3] for a review. It is currently unclear
to what extent ad hoc wireless networks will be subject to
various attacks. The history of security of home and small
mobile computing platforms however points out that such
attacks can disrupt or even completely interrupt the normal
operations of networks [4].
In the future protecting ad hoc wireless networks can
become as challenging a task as protecting home computing
platforms. Many ad hoc networks are expected to be based
on wireless devices with restricted computational and com-
munication capabilities, and very limited battery resources. In
many application scenarios, attack signature updates from a
centralized site are infeasible. Correcting the consequences
of some failures or attacks might only be possible by a
costly human intervention, or not at all. An example where
such a correction might be nearly impossible are underwater
networks [5].
The above facts establish the basic motivation for design-
ing autonomous detection and response systems that aim
at offering an additional line of defense to the employed
secure protocols. Such systems should provide several layers
of functionality including the following: (i) distributed self-
learning and self-tuning with the aspiration to minimize the
need for human intervention and maintenance, (ii) active
response with focus on attenuation and possibly elimination
of negative effects of misbehavior on the network.
The ability of self-learning and self-tuning implies a set of
observable features, from which it can be deduced whether
a member of an ad hoc network misbehaves or whether the
conditions in the given ad hoc network could lead to decreased
Quality of Service to others. An important task is therefore to
identify a set of features that are useful in detecting a larger
set of misbehavior types.
Best current practices for misbehavior detection in ad hoc
wireless networks are almost exclusively done on a domain
knowledge basis; see [2], [3], [6] and references therein.
Although such an approach allows to find a good predictor
for a specific type of misbehavior, it fails to deliver a broader
knowledge on design specifics of misbehavior detection sys-
tems.
Our goal was to benefit from the wealth of information
available at the various layers of the OSI protocol stack
and to provide a performance assessment of misbehavior
detection done by a single node or by several nodes acting
in a cooperative manner complemented with exchange of
network measurements (features). We divided the examined
feature set into several subsets with respect to their energy
efficiency and protocol assumptions. We employed a wrapper
method [7] to assess the efficiency of individual features
subsets. Most importantly, we investigated applicability of
a mechanism inspired by the efficiency of the Biological
immune system (BIS). The BIS and its technical counterpart,
Artificial immune systems (AIS), are currently under increased
examination in the area of wireless networks security [8],
[9], [10]. Our approach is motivated by the mechanisms that
allow the key players of the BIS such as T-cells, B-cells,
dendritic cells, macrophages etc. to communicate with each
other and thus provide a more robust mechanism for detecting
and eliminating foreign agents such as viruses or bacteria.
2Our focus stays especially on the remarkable ability of the
BIS to avoid false positives in the classification process [11].
This is demonstrated by the rareness of severe auto-immune
reactions in humans (although milder forms of allergies are
unfortunately rather frequent).
This document is organized as follows. In Section II we give
a short overview of the Biological immune system. Section III
offers a summary of the related work. In Section IV our
evaluation approach is introduced. In Section V we summarize
the assumptions and protocols relevant to our experiments.
Section VI defines the features used in the performance
evaluation. In Section VII our immuno-inspired architecture
is introduced and analyzed. Section VIII describes in detail
the experimental setup. In Section IX we discuss the obtained
results. And finally, in Section X we conclude and give an
outlook on future research.
II. THE BIOLOGICAL IMMUNE SYSTEM
The Biological immune system (BIS) [11] can quickly rec-
ognize the presence of foreign microorganisms in the human
body. It is remarkably efficient, most of the time, in correctly
detecting and eliminating pathogens such as viruses, bacteria,
fungi or parasites, and in choosing the correct immune re-
sponse. When confronted with a pathogen, the BIS relies on
the coordinated response from both of its two vital parts:
• the innate system: the innate immune system is able to
recognize the presence of a pathogen or tissue injury, and
is able to signal this to the adaptive immune system.
• the adaptive system: the adaptive immune system can
develop during the lifetime of its host a specific set of
immune responses.
For an immune reaction to occur, it is necessary that (i)
a cell has been classified as a pathogen and (ii) this cell
could cause some damage to the human organism. This means
that the BIS is only reactive with infectious cells, i.e. with
pathogens that can indeed cause harm [11].
This demonstrates that a two-way communication, hereafter
referred to as co-stimulation, between the innate and adaptive
immune systems is common. Immunologists such as Frauwirth
and Thompson describe co-stimulation as the involvement of
”reciprocal and sequential signals between cells” in order to
fully activate a lymphocyte [12]. The role of lymphocytes is
to recognize a specific pathogen, to trigger a corresponding
immune reaction, in some forms they are also capable of
pathogen elimination.
In the subsequent sections we will introduce and evaluate
an approach inspired by the interplay between the innate and
adaptive immune system. The goal of this approach is to help
suppress false positives and at the same time achieve energy
efficiency.
III. RELATED WORK
A. AIS Based Misbehavior Detection
The early work in adapting the BIS to networking has been
done by Stephanie Forrest and her group at the University of
New Mexico. In one of the first BIS inspired works, Hofmeyr
and Forrest [13] described an AIS able to detect anomalies
in a wired TCP/IP network. Co-stimulation was in their setup
done by a human operator who was given 24 hours to confirm
a detected attack.
Sarafijanovic´ and Le Boudec [8] introduced an AIS for
misbehavior detection in mobile ad hoc wireless networks.
They used four different features based on the network layer
of the OSI protocol stack. They were able to achieve a
detection rate of about 55%; they only considered simple
packet dropping with different rates as misbehavior. A co-
stimulation in the form of a danger signal emitted by a
connection source was used to inform nodes on the forwarding
path about perceived data packet loss.
An AIS for sensor networks was proposed by Drozda et al.
in [10]. The implemented misbehavior was packet dropping;
the detection rate was about 70%.
Classification techniques proposed in [13], [8], [14], [10]
were based on the negative selection, a learning mechanism
applied in training and priming of T-cells in the thymus.
In the computational approach to negative selection due to
D’haeseleer et al. [15], a complement to an n-dimensional
vector set is constructed. This is done by producing random
vectors and testing them against vectors in the original vector
set. If a random vector does not match anything in the original
set, it becomes a member of the complement (detector) set.
The vectors from the detector set are then used to identify
anomalies (misbehavior). Only very recently, an efficient al-
gorithm for negative selection was presented by Elberfeld and
Textor [16].
An approach based on the Danger theory was proposed by
Kim et al. in [9]. Several types of danger signals, each having
a different function are employed in order to detect routing
manipulation in sensor wireless networks. The authors did not
undertake any performance analysis of their approach.
It is beyond the scope of this document to provide an
exhaustive summary of AIS based approaches. A review of
the theoretical aspects of several BIS inspired algorithms was
compiled by Timmis et al. in [17]. The various application ar-
eas of BIS inspired approaches were reviewed by D. Dasgupta
in [18]. The applicability with respect to ad hoc networks was
reviewed in [19].
Even though the BIS seems to be a good inspiration for im-
proving misbehavior detection in ad hoc and sensor networks,
approaches based on machine learning and similar methods
received much more attention; see [6], [2] and the references
therein. Despite recent efforts, energy efficient misbehavior
detection remains to be an open problem. In the following
sections, we use the watchdog approach due to Marti et al. [20]
as a basis in our misbehavior detection and energy efficiency
evaluation. Even though, the watchdog approach is not energy
efficient, it received a great attention in the literature and it is
thus perceived by many as the standard approach.
3Feature Selection
AlgorithmComputation
Feature
Simulation
Training Set
Algorithm
Induction
Final
Evaluation
Test Set
Setup
Sim
Initial State
(Example: 000001000000000000000)
Performance
Optimal
Feature
Vector
Feature
Subset and
Training Set
Pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
Fig. 1. Wrapper approach.
B. Cascading Classifiers
The misbehavior classification approach, that we herein
present and analyze, resembles the “cascading classifiers” of
Kaynak and Alpaydin introduced in [21]. Their approach is
based on a sequential application of several classifiers such
that ”at the next stage, using a costlier classifier, we build a
more complex rule to cover those uncovered patterns of the
previous stage”. Our BIS inspired approach can be seen as
an instance of cascading classification. It is however not the
complexity of classification rules that is increased at each step
but the energy cost connected with observing additional states
and events necessary for a more precise reasoning about a
possible misbehavior.
Cascading classifiers were empirically studied by Gama and
Brazdil in [22]. They combined several types of classifiers:
Bayes classifier, C4.5 and linear discriminant function. Their
focal point was to investigate whether cascading classification
could offer some classification performance improvement over
the classification using a single classifier.
IV. EVALUATION APPROACH
To evaluate the performance of our immuno-inspired ar-
chitecture, we use the wrapper approach described in [7].
The wrapper approach requires a training and a test data set
as input. In our case, these data sets are obtained through
simulating an ad hoc network. Our choice of network simulator
was JiST/SWANS [23]. SWANS is a Java based network
simulator that offers a substantial simulation performance
speed-up over other alternatives, most notably Glomosim and
ns2. Vectors in both sets are labeled as either representing a
normal behavior or behavior when the network is subject to
an attack or intrusion.
Since the feature space can be large, it is desirable to iden-
tify features that can significantly contribute to misbehavior
detection. This is done by running an optimization algorithm
over the feature space. The goal of the optimization is to find a
(small) feature subset that is efficient in detecting misbehavior.
In our case, the input to the optimization algorithm is encoded
as a bit vector of length k; a bit at position i set to 1 means
that the i-th feature is in the feature subset currently evaluated.
The wrapper approach in our setup is depicted in Fig. 1. It can
be summarized as follows:
1) Training and test data sets are produced through simu-
lation.
2) An optimization algorithm computes a subset of the fea-
ture space that is expected to be optimal with respect to
one or several performance measures. The optimization
algorithm is initialized with an empty (with all bits set
to zero) or random bit vector.
3) An induction algorithm uses a part of the training set
to learn a classifier. This classifier is applied to the
remaining part (hold-out set); performance measures are
computed. The optimization algorithm is supplied with
performance measures of the classifier using the current
feature subset. Steps (2) and (3) are repeated until a
termination condition is met.
4) At last, a thorough evaluation of the optimal feature
subset using the same induction algorithm as in Step (3)
and employing the test set is done. This optimal feature
set alongside with its expected performance are being
output.
The training and test sets and the hold-out set in Step (3)
were produced by using stratified n-fold cross-validation [24].
V. PROTOCOLS AND DEFINITIONS
A. Protocols
We now state several protocols, mechanisms and assump-
tions relevant to our experiments. Node misbehavior can be
the result of an intrusion, or a software or hardware failure.
Additional faults in ad hoc networks can be introduced by
mobility, signal propagation, link reliability and other factors.
The reason for nodes (possibly fully controlled by an attacker)
to execute any form of misbehavior can range from the desire
to save battery power to the intention of making an ad hoc
network non-operational.
We consider AODV [25], a well-known on-demand routing
protocol using the RREQ and RREP handshake to establish
routes, as the underlying routing protocol.
At the MAC (Medium access control) layer, the contention
based IEEE 802.11 MAC protocol using both carrier sensing
and RTS-CTS-DATA-ACK handshake is considered. Should
the medium not be available or the handshake fails, an
exponential back-off algorithm is used. This is combined with
a mechanism that makes it easier for neighboring nodes to
estimate transmission durations. This is done by an exchange
of duration values and their subsequent storing in a data
structure known as Network allocation vector (NAV).
4Alternative MAC protocols like the 802.15.4 MAC proto-
col avoid using the RTS-CTS-DATA-ACK handshake, only
relying on carrier sensing to access the medium, in order to
decrease energy consumption at nodes.
User Datagram Protocol (UDP) is a transport layer protocol
that does not guarantee any reliability, data integrity or data
packet ordering.
In promiscuous mode, a node listens to the on-going traffic
among other nodes in the neighborhood and collects informa-
tion from the overheard packets. Promiscuous mode is energy
inefficient because it prevents the wireless interface to operate
in sleep mode, forcing it into either idle or receive mode;
there is also extra overhead caused by analyzing all overheard
packets. According to [26], power consumption in idle and
receive modes is about 12-20 higher than in sleep mode.
We do not assume any time synchronization among nodes.
We assume that packets are authenticated, i.e. the sender of
any packet can be easily identified and as well can be any
changes in the packet body. This is a reasonable assumption
in line with e.g. the ZigBee specification [27].
B. Performance Measures
We evaluate the misbehavior classification performance in
terms of detection rate and false positives (FP) rate. We assume
that a classifier K computed by a learning algorithm is used
in the classification process. The classifier K is then used to
classify the objects Ω = {o1, ..., op}, where p is the number
of objects. The two measures are then computed as follows:
det. rateΩcj (K) =
ccj
ncj
× 100.0% (1)
FP rateΩcj (K) =
FPcj
FPcj + ccj
× 100.0% (2)
where cj is the j-th class. ncj is the number of objects
labeled with the class cj ; note that ncj > 0 in all our
experiments. ccj is the number of objects that were cor-
rectly classified by the learning algorithm as belonging to the
class cj . FPcj is the number of objects incorrectly predicted
as belonging to cj . 95% confidence intervals (CI95%) were
computed for each measure.
The overall misclassification rate is evaluated by means of
the classification error:
class. errorΩ(K) =
∑
cj
FPcj
∑
cj
ncj
× 100.0% (3)
VI. THE FEATURES
We considered 24 features from three layers of the OSI
protocol stack: data link (MAC), network and transport layer.
Our focus was on two basic types of features: (i) performance
related such as e.g. latency or throughput and (ii) network
topology related such as e.g. node degree, network diameter,
average path length to a destination as recorded in the routing
table. We also included features well known previously such
as the watchdog feature [20]; some others were motivated by
the results published in [3], [10]. The features, not adapted
from [20], [3], [10], were found by considering the used
protocols and choosing such features that do not add too much
computational overhead. There was no formal method (Petri
nets etc.) applied in this process.
Let ss, s1, ..., si, si+1, si+2, ..., sd be the path between ss
and sd determined by a routing protocol, where ss is the
source node, sd is the destination node. The features in the
below introduced feature set f are averaged over a sliding
time window of the size win. size. Let pctsTX and pctsRX
be the number of data packets sent and received by si in a
time window of the size win. size, respectively.
MAC Layer Features:
M1 MAC handshake ratio: Computed by si as:
M1 =
∑pctsTX
p=1
#ACKp
#RTSp
pctsTX
where #RTSp is the number of RTS packets sent
to si+1 and #ACKp is the number of ACK packets
received by si from si+1, when reserving the wireless
medium for the packet p. This feature estimates the
medium congestion level from the number of hand-
shakes that were brought to completion, i.e. did not end
up before an ACK was received.
M2 Back-off level index: MAC protocol back-off level BO
just before a data packet p is transmitted from si to si+1.
M2 =
∑pctsTX
p=1 BOp
pctsTX
M2 is similar to M1, the congestion level is, however,
estimated from the number of back-offs.
M3 Forwarding index (watchdog): Ratio of data packets
sent from si to si+1, TXsi and then subsequently
forwarded to si+2, TXsi+1 .
M3 =
TXsi+1
TXsi
The data packets that have si+1 as the destination node
are excluded from this statistic.
M4 Processing delay: Time delay that a data packet accu-
mulates at si+1 before being forwarded to si+2.
M4 =
∑pctsTX
p=1 delaysi+1
pctsTX
The data packets that have si+1 as the destination node
are excluded from this statistic.
M5 Data rate index: Amount of data (in bits/s) forwarded
by node si in a time window.
M5 =
∑pctsTX
p=1 size(p)
win. size
where size(p) is the size of a data packet p that is
forwarded in the given time window. The data packets
that originate at si are excluded.
M6 Node degree index: Number of neighboring nodes with
which si had an active data exchange:
M6 = #neigh
5where #neigh is the number of neighbors in a time
window.
M7 2-hop neighborhood index: Number of neighboring
nodes within 2-hop distance from si:
M7 = #2neigh
where #2neigh is the number of unique MAC layer
destinations extracted from overheard data packets in a
time window.
Routing Layer Features:
R1 Forwarding index for RREQ: Number of unique
RREQs (i.e. with a unique source id and sequence
number) forwarded by the node si. Normalized by the
time window size:
R1 =
#RREQ
win. size
R2 Forwarding index for RERR: Number of RERRs
forwarded by the node si. Normalized by the time
window size:
R2 =
#RERR
win. size
R3 Forwarding index for RREP: The same ratio as in M3
but computed separately for RREP routing packets.
R4 Processing delay for RREP: The same delay as in M4
but computed separately for RREP routing packets.
R5 Average distance to destination: Average number of
hops from si to any destination as recorded in the routing
table:
R5 =
∑table size
k=1 |rk|
table size
where |rk| is the length of the route rk to a destination
and table size is the number of destinations recorded.
R6 Routing activity index: Number of RREQ, RREP and
RERR packets received by node si. Normalized by the
time window size.
R6 =
#RREQ+#RREP +#RERR
win. size
R7 Connectivity index 1: Number of unreachable destina-
tions #unreach as recorded in the routing table of node
si.
R7 = #unreach
R8 Connectivity index 2: Number of invalid routes
#invalid as recorded in the routing table of node si.
R8 = #invalid
R9 Connectivity index 3: Number of destinations #dest
with known routes as recorded in the routing table of
node si.
R9 = #dest
R10 Cut index 1: Number of connections #connect with
data packets forwarded by node si in a time window.
R10 = #connect
R11 Cut index 2: Number of RREP packets forwarded by
node si. Normalized by the time window size.
R11 =
#RREP
win. size
R12 Diameter index: Number of hops to the furthermost
destination as recorded in the routing table of node si.
R12 = maxk{|rk|}
where k = 1 . . . table size.
Transport Layer Features:
T1 Out-of-order packet index: Number of DATA packets
that were received by si out of order.
T 1 =
#OO
win. size
where #OO is the number of data packet received
out-of-order. #OO is incremented, if node si re-
ceives on the connection c a data packet pj such that
seq. number(pj) − 1 6= seq. number(pj−1), where
seq. number(pj) is the sequence number of the data
packet pj . This assumes that the connection source uses
an incremental (or similar easily predictable) scheme for
computing seq. number(pj).
T2 Interarrival packet delay index 1: Average delay
between data packets pj and pj+1 sequentially received
by si. The delay was computed separately for each
connection and then a master average was computed.
T 2 =
∑#connect
c=1 avg delayc
#connect
where avg delayc is the average delay for data packets
belonging to the connection c. It is defined as:
∑pctscRX
j=1 delayc(pj+1, pj)
pctscRX
where pctscRX is the number of data packets received
by si on the connection c. delayc(pj+1, pj) is the delay
between the data packets pj+1 and pj transported by the
connection c.
T3 Interarrival packet delay variance index 1: Variance
of delay between DATA packets received by si. The
variance was computed separately for each connection
and then a master average was computed.
T 3 =
∑#connect
c=1 avg var delayc
#connect
where avg var delayc is the variance of the delay for
data packets belonging to the connection c. It is defined
as:
∑pctscRX
j=1 (delayc(pj+1, pj)− avg delayc)
2
pctscRX − 1
6ss //_____ si // si+1 // si+2
Co−stimulation set (fˆ2)
{{
//____ sd
Fig. 2. Data traffic measurement model.
T4 Interarrival packet delay index 2: Average delay
between DATA packets received by si.
T 4 =
∑pctsRX
j=1 delay(pj+1, pj)
pctsRX
where delay(pj+1, pj) is the delay between any two data
subsequent packets pj+1 and pj received by si.
T5 Interarrival packet delay variance index 2: Variance
of delay between DATA packets received by si.
T 5 =
∑pctsRX
j=1 (delay(pj+1, pj)− T 4)
2
pctsRX − 1
Occasionally, it was not possible to compute a feature
because there was no traffic between si and si+1. Such time
windows were not included in our experiments. The features
T2, T4 and T3, T5 are identical, if only data packets belonging
to a single connection are received by si.
The watchdog features M3–M4, R1–R4 and the M7 feature
can be considered energy inefficient because they rely on
promiscuous mode. Therefore, we decided to consider the
following three subsets of the feature set f :
1) f0 = f .
2) f1 = f0 \ {M3,M4,M7, R1 − R4}. f1 excludes all
features that rely on promiscuous mode.
3) f2 = f1 \ {M1}. f2 further excludes features based on
MAC protocols using the RTS-CTS-DATA-ACK hand-
shake. This subset could be relevant to sensor networks
based on the IEEE 802.15.4 MAC protocol.
To distinguish between a feature set and its numerical
instance computed in a given time window, we introduce the
following “hat” notation: fˆ0, fˆ1 and fˆ2.
VII. AN IMMUNO-INSPIRED APPROACH
A. General Description
Our approach is inspired by the co-stimulation mechanism
of the BIS. Since co-stimulation benefits from the interplay
between the innate and adaptive immune systems, we decided
to base misbehavior detection on two different feature sets
S1 and S2. These two feature sets serve as a basis for two
interconnected classifiers K(S1) and K(S2).
The classification is done by sequentially applying K(S1)
and K(S2), where K(S1) mimics the classification capability
of the innate immune system and K(S2) mimics the classifi-
cation capability of the adaptive immune system:
K(S1)
co−stimulation
// K(S2) (4)
Let ξSi , i = 1, 2 be a feature cost measure that reflects all
feature computation costs induced by the feature set Si. Our
goal was to use S1 and S2, such that:
ξS1 < ξS2 (5)
class. errorΩ(K(S1)) > class. error
Ω(K(S2)) (6)
This means, first a classifier with a lower feature cost
but a higher classification error is applied. If the classifier
K(S1) detects a misbehavior, then the classifier K(S2) with a
higher feature cost and a lower classification error is applied.
Hereafter we refer to the conditional process that triggers the
K(S2) classification as co-stimulation. Note that if the condi-
tion expressed in Eq. 6 is not fulfilled, only a classification
based on S1 is necessary, since K(S1) would offer both a
lower classification error and a lower feature cost.
Co-stimulation in the BIS can take form of a feedback
loop [12], where one part of the BIS interacts with another part
and vice-versa, until the activation threshold for an immune
reaction is met. For the ease of co-stimulation performance
analysis, we decided not to consider such a feedback loop this
time.
B. Detailed Description
Co-stimulation can be in ad hoc wireless networks imple-
mented in several ways depending on the application scenario,
the applied protocols or the expected misbehavior type. Let us
focus on an application scenario with the assumption that a
misbehaving node can be detected by its neighbors.
This translates to our architecture as follows: the node
si+2 computes the restricted feature set fˆ2 (or fˆ1). This (co-
stimulatory) feature set is then proliferated in the upstream
connection direction (towards connection source); see Fig. 2.
Since the computation of fˆ2 is time window based, the
frequency with which fˆ2 gets sent depends on the time window
size. In our implementation, fˆ2 was sent out immediately at
the end of each time window. Upon receiving fˆ2, the node
si compares it with its own fˆ2 sample (later we introduce a
machine learning approach that implements this comparison
task). Based on this, a behavior classification with respect to
the node si+1 is done. If si classifies si+1 as misbehaving,
it will compute fˆ0. If misbehavior is detected again, si+1 is
finally classified as misbehaving.
Before proceeding any further, we introduce the following
notation in order to keep track of composite feature sets
computed at si and si+2: Fsi0 = f
si
0 ∪f
si+2
0 , F
si
1 = f
si
1 ∪f
si+2
1
and Fsi2 = f
si
2 ∪ f
si+2
2 . Similarly, Fˆ
si
0 = fˆ
si
0 ◦ fˆ
si+2
0 ,
Fˆsi1 = fˆ
si
1 ◦ fˆ
si+2
1 and Fˆ
si
2 = fˆ
si
2 ◦ fˆ
si+2
2 , where ◦ is the
operator of vector concatenation. For simplicity, whenever
clear from the context, we will omit the superscripts.
A formal description of our co-stimulation inspired ap-
proach is presented in Alg. 1. With respect to the notation
introduced in Eq. 4, our co-stimulation inspired approach can
be succinctly expressed as:
K(F2)
co−stimulation
// K(f0) (7)
7Algorithm 1 Co-stimulation based misbehavior detection at node si
Require: Sufficient data traffic in current time window
Require: fˆ si+22 from 2-hop downstream node
1: procedure DETECT MISBEHAVIOR
2: boolean suspicious← False
3: fˆ si2 ← COMPUTE f2 FEATURE SAMPLE(si)
4: Fˆ2 ← fˆ
si
2 ∪ fˆ
si+2
2
5: if CLASSIFICATION(Fˆ2) == misbehavior then
6: suspicious← True
7: end if
8: if suspicious == True then ⊲ Co-stimulation: K(F2)→ K(f0)
9: fˆ0 ← COMPUTE f0 FEATURE SAMPLE(si)
10: if CLASSIFICATION(fˆ0) == misbehavior then
11: MARK AS MISBEHAVING(si+1) ⊲ Misbehavior confirmed
12: end if
13: end if
14: end procedure
In the following sections, we show, using experiments and
an energy model for an IEEE 802.11 wireless card, that Eq. 5
and Eq. 6 hold in this case.
A few observations can be made at this stage. The prolif-
eration of fˆ2 can be implemented without adding any extra
communication complexity by attaching this information to
CTS or ACK MAC packets (a modification the MAC protocol
would be necessary). As long as there are DATA packets being
forwarded on this connection, the feature set can be prolifer-
ated. If there is no DATA traffic on the connection (and thus no
CTS/ACK packets exchanged), the relative necessity to detect
the possibly misbehaving node si+1 decreases. Optionally,
proliferation of fˆ2 can be implemented by increasing the radio
radius at si+2, by broadcasting it with a low time-to-live value
or by using a standalone packet type.
If the node si+1 decides not to cooperate in forwarding the
feature set information, the node si will switch, after a time-
out, to fˆ0 computation. In this respect, not receiving fˆ2 can be
understood as a form of negative co-stimulation. If the goal is
to detect a node controlled by an attacker, it is important that
the originator of fˆ2 can be unambiguously identified, i.e. an
authentication is necessary. An additional requirement is the
use of sequence numbers for fˆ2. Otherwise, the misbehaving
node si+1 could interfere with the mechanism by forwarding
outdated cached fˆ2.
In general, if fˆ0 were proliferated instead of fˆ2, the size of
the feature space at the receiving node si doubles, in our case
to 48 features. If higher statistical moments were computed
for all the features in f0, the feature space size could easily
reach (or even surpass) 100 depending on the complexity
of employed protocols. This fact translates it into a typical
machine learning classification problem that we discuss in the
following sections.
To summarize, after si receives fˆ2: (i) it will process fˆ2, if
it is not originating from si+1 or (ii) it will forward fˆ2 to all
upstream neighbors, otherwise. This means, each such feature
set travels only two hops. Notice that, in general, si+1 or si+2
can have several successor or predecessor nodes. This happens
if si+1 or si+2 forwards data packets for several connections.
More formally, we assume that | • si+1| ≥ 1, | • si+2| ≥ 1 and
|si+1 • | ≥ 1, where •sk, sk• are the sets of all predecessor
and successor nodes of sk, respectively. The upper limit for
the number of received fˆ2 per time window is thus the number
of connections for which si forwarded data packets.
C. Co-stimulation Analysis
Let us now take a closer look at the classification per-
formance of our co-stimulation approach. Let Ω be a set
of vectors that should be classified. Let ΩF2 ⊆ Ω be the
subset of vectors that were marked as suspicious (i.e. possibly
representing a misbehavior), after K(F2) was applied.
Let us first assume that class. errorΩ(K(f0)) = 0. If K(f0)
is applied to ΩF2 , it clearly holds:
class. errorΩF2 (K(f0)) = 0 (8)
This implies, for the final FP rate with respect to a misbe-
havior class cj , after co-stimulation is applied, it holds:
FP rateΩcj (K(F2)→ K(f0)) = 0 (9)
In other words, the application of K(f0) removes all vectors
that were misclassified by K(F2). Furthermore, the final
detection rate for the given class cj is determined by the
detection rate of the K(F2) classifier:
det. rateΩcj (K(F2)→ K(f0)) = det. rate
Ω
cj
(K(F2) (10)
The rationale is, only the vectors correctly classified after
the K(F2) classification form a basis for K(f0) classification.
Since to achieve class. errorΩ(K(f0)) = 0 may not be
possible, Eq. 10 translates for class. errorΩ(K(f0)) 6= 0 to:
det. rateΩcj (K(F2)→ K(f0)) ≤ det. rate
Ω
cj
(K(F2)) (11)
8To formulate a similar relationship for the false positives
rate is non-trivial, since, in general, ΩF2 can be an arbitrary
subset of Ω. However, if:
FP rate
ΩF2
cj (K(f0)) = FP rate
Ω
cj
(K(f0)) (12)
then it holds:
FP rateΩcj (K(F2)→ K(f0)) = FP rate
Ω
cj
(K(f0)) (13)
The validity of this relationship can be well estimated
through experimental analysis. Our experimental setup and the
related results are presented in Sec. VIII and Sec. IX.
VIII. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
Topology, Connections, Data Traffic and Protocols: We
used a topology based on a snapshot from the movement
prescribed by the Random waypoint movement model [28].
There were 1,718 nodes simulated; the physical area size was
3,000m × 3,000m. We used this topology due to the fact that
this topology was quite extensively studied by Barrett et al.
in [29]; results reported therein include many graph-theoretical
measures that were helpful in finding suitable parameters for
our experiments.
We modeled data traffic as Constant bit rate (CBR), i.e.
there was a constant delay when injecting data packets. This
constant delay in our experiments was 2 seconds (injection
rate of 0.5 packet/s); the packet size was 68 bytes. CBR data
packet sources correspond e.g. to sensors that transmit their
measurements in predefined constant intervals. CBR can be
considered an extreme model for data packet injection due to
its synchronized nature (if a data packet collision at a node
occurs, there is a high chance that it occurs again in the future).
In fact, the results published in [30] show that when using a
stochastic injection model, such as the Poisson traffic model,
one can expect a better performance of the detection system.
We used 50 concurrent connections. The connection length
was 7 hops. In order to represent a dynamically changing
system, we allowed connections to expire. An expired connec-
tion was replaced by another connection starting at a random
source node that was not used previously. Each connection
was scheduled to exist approximately 15 to 20 minutes. The
exact connection duration was computed as
δ + rUλ (14)
where δ the desired duration time of a connection, rU
a random number from the uniform distribution [0, 1] and
λ the desired variance of the connection duration. In our
experiments, we used λ = 5 min.
We used the AODV routing protocol, IEEE 802.11b MAC
protocol, UDP transport protocol and IPv4. The channel
frequency was set to 2.4 GHz. The transmission rate was set to
2 Mbps. We used the Two-ray signal propagation model [31].
Antenna and signal propagation properties were set so that the
resulting radio radius equaled 100 meters.
Misbehavior models: We considered three types of misbe-
havior. (i) DATA packet dropping: 30% DATA packets were
randomly and uniformly dropped at misbehaving nodes. (ii)
DATA packet delaying: 30% DATA packets were randomly
and uniformly delayed by 0.1 second at misbehaving nodes.
(iii) Wormholes [32]. Wormholes are private (out-of-band)
links between one or several pairs of nodes. They are added
by an attacker in order to attract data traffic into them to
gain control over packet routing and other network operations.
There were 20 wormholes in each simulation run; the length
of wormholes was 15 hops, i.e. the source and sink were 15
hops away before a given wormhole was activated.
There were 236 randomly chosen nodes to execute DATA
dropping or delaying misbehavior. As it is hard to predict the
routing of packets, many of these nodes could not execute any
misbehavior as there were no DATA packets to be forwarded
by them. In our case, 236 misbehaving nodes resulted in about
20-30 actively (concurrently) misbehaving nodes.
In case of the dropping and delaying misbehavior, our
intention was to model random failure occurrences, assuming
a uniform failure distribution in the network. The wormhole
misbehavior is an instance of misbehavior done in collusion,
i.e. two nodes must closely cooperate. Any of these types of
misbehavior can have a significant impact on the medium con-
tention resolution. DATA dropping removes packets from the
network and can thus decrease medium congestion. DATA de-
laying impacts the distribution of medium contention. Worm-
holes can cause severe changes to a network’s topology and
therefore impact the quality of medium contention at certain
nodes (such as those lying on a network cut before a wormhole
was activated).
Experiments: We did 20 independent runs for each misbe-
havior type and 20 misbehavior free (normal) runs (4×20 runs
in total). The simulation time for each run was 4 hours. We
used a non-overlapping time window approach for the feature
computation. We used four different time window sizes: 50,
100, 250 and 500 seconds. In case of a 500-second time
window, there were 28 non-overlapping windows in each run
(4 hours/500 seconds = 28.8). This gave us 4 × 20 × 28 =
2,240 vectors (samples) for each node.
Labeling and constructing the training and test sets: The
vectors in the training and test sets were labeled as follows: if
the node si+1 was in a given time window misbehaving, i.e.
dropping/delaying packets or the start point of a wormhole,
the vector Fˆ0, Fˆ1 or Fˆ2 was labeled with the respective
misbehavior class. The vectors from normal runs were all
labeled as “normal”. In order to simplify the experiments,
we only considered 20 distinct nodes with high traffic rates
and different node degrees. The nodes were chosen to ensure
that enough vectors representing each misbehavior class were
available. Notice that some vectors were excluded from the
experiments because there was no data traffic between si
and si+1.
Optimization algorithm: We used forward selection as op-
timization algorithm for the wrapper approach [24]. This
algorithm starts with an empty feature set. The feature that
decreases the residual classification error the most will then
9be added. Following this greedy approach, a new feature gets
added as long as it decreases the residual classification error.
Optimization by means of forward feature selection delivers a
normalized feature weight vector. These normalized weights
(range between 0.0− 1.0) are proportional to the significance
of a given feature. A feature weight vector was computed for
each of the top 20 nodes. An average feature weight vector is
reported.
Induction algorithm: We used a decision tree classifier. We
were interested in a less complex algorithm since the wrapper
method requires that the algorithm is executed multiple times.
To decide whether a node within the decision tree should
be further split (impurity measure), we used the information
gain measure. As the decision tree classifier is a well-known
algorithm, we omit its discussion. We refer the interested
reader to [24].
We used implementations of the optimization and induction
algorithms from the Rapidminer tool [33]. Rapidminer is an
open-source tool for complex data mining tasks.
Parameters in the experimental setup are summarized in
Fig. 3.
IX. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
A. Basic Performance
In this subsection, we discuss the misbehavior detection
performance of K(F0), K(F1) and K(F2). We first discuss
the performance of these three classifiers in isolation. The
performance of our co-stimulation based approach is discussed
in Sec. IX-C and Sec. IX-D.
The results with respect to the detection and false positives
rate are reported in Table I and II. The detection and FP
rates were computed also for all types of misbehavior merged
into a single class. This allows for a better understanding of
“misbehavior/no-misbehavior” classification performance. It
can be observed that K(F0) performed very well with respect
to normal behavior, and dropping and delaying misbehavior.
In case of the wormholes misbehavior, the FP rate was in the
range 4.35 − 9.81%. Both K(F1) and K(F2) perform much
worse than K(F0). The FP rate for K(F1) and K(F2) was in
many cases alarmingly high. Decreasing the time window size
delivered in many cases a statistically significant improvement.
In Table III, the confusion matrices for K(F0) and K(F2)
with window size equal 50 seconds are shown. A confu-
sion matrix contains information about actual and predicted
classifications done by a classification algorithm. Only the
classification outcome for the top 20 nodes is reported. Notice
that sample sizes per node were not identical. Therefore, the
detection and FP rates reported in Table I and II are slightly
different from the detection and FP rates that can be derived
from Table III. It can be seen that the wormhole misbehavior
was often misclassified as normal behavior. The reason for that
is, according to our wormhole model, a wormhole is used only
if it lies on the shortest path to a destination. This means, in
some cases only a small fraction of the data traffic received at
si+1 was taking “advantage” of the wormhole. Such a traffic
pattern was harder to distinguish from the normal traffic. Note
also that the sample size for the wormhole misbehavior is
smaller than by the other classes. This is due to the fact
that the number of wormholes in a network must not exceed
a certain limit, otherwise the induced topological changes
become extreme.
An interesting question is which features contributed the
most to the overall performance. Feature weights are reported
in Table IV (only features with a weight greater or equal 0.25
are shown). Features that were computed locally (at node si)
are appended with “L”; features that were received from a
remote node (si+2) are appended with “R” (see Fig. 2).
K(F0) was dominated by the watchdog features with M3 L
and M4 L having the highest weights. K(F2) with 50s time
window was dominated by R9 L, T1 L, T3 L, T1 R and
T3 R. Packet dropping and delaying classification was based
on the features T1 L, T3 L, T1 R and T3 R (we inspected the
actual rules computed by the decision tree classifier). In this
case, the classification was based on learning the differences
in traffic at nodes si and si+2.
In the absence of the watchdog features, precision of
wormhole classification was benefiting from the two topology
features R5 L and R9 L; the reason is that wormholes in-
crease the number of nodes that lie in a node’s neighborhood.
This precludes the necessity to rely on the features received
from si+2 since under wormhole misbehavior si+2 might be
identical with a wormhole’s end point. We would like to point
out that even though with R5 L can be easily manipulated
by the wormhole, R9 L is much more resilient. This feature
reflects the increased routing utility of nodes that lie in the
neighborhood of a wormhole. It should also be noted that
when using F0, wormhole detection is partly based on the
M3 L watchdog feature, since wormholes by sending over
a private link appear not to be forwarding packets. For the
same reason, in more dynamic scenarios, the existence of a
wormhole might also get exposed, if medium congestion at
its start point drops significantly.
Another result to be seen in Table IV is the insignificance
of the MAC features M1 and M2. Both M1 and M2 indirectly
measure the medium congestion around a node. This means,
should a node be dropping packets and thus decreasing the
need for medium access, this should get detected with the
help of M1. On the other hand, any packet dropping should
also get directly detected by the watchdog feature M3. There
was a consideration that as M1 increases in value, M3 would
accordingly decrease in value, i.e. M1 and M3 would form
a kind of dynamic equilibrium. This however could not be
demonstrated in our setup. The reason for that seems to be
the relatively low data packet injection rate (0.5 packet/s)
connected with additional data packets dropping (further de-
creasing the number of data packets being forwarded). We
believe, studying such equilibria could improve performance
of misbehavior detection, at least in more dynamical scenarios
than the one presented herein.
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1) Induction algorithm: Decision tree with information gain measure (impurity measure).
2) Feature selection algorithm: Forward feature selection.
3) Validation approach: n-fold cross-validation with n = 20.
4) Misbehavior types: Packet dropping, packet delaying, wormholes.
5) Performance measures: Classification error, detection rate and false positives rate, their arithmetic average and 95% confidence
intervals.
6) Network topology: Snapshot of movement modeled by random waypoint mobility model i.e. it is a static network. There were
1,718 nodes. The area was a square of 2,900m×2,950m. The transmission range of transceivers was 100 meters.
7) Number of connections: 50 CBR (constant bit rate) connections. MAC protocol: IEEE 802.11b DCF. Routing protocol: AODV.
Other parameters: (i) Propagation path-loss model: two ray (ii) Channel frequency: 2.4 GHz (iii) Topography: Line-of-sight (iv)
Radio type: Accnoise (v) Network protocol: IPv4 (vi) Transport protocol: UDP.
8) Injection rate: 0.5 packet/second. Data packet size was 68 bytes.
9) The number of independent simulation runs for each combination of input parameters was 20. The simulation time was 4 hours.
10) Simulator used: JiST/SWANS; hardware used: 30× Linux (SuSE 10.0) PC with 2GB RAM and Pentium 4 3GHz microprocessor.
Fig. 3. Parameters used in the experiment.
Normal Dropping Delaying Wormhole Any misbehavior
Window size[s] Det. rate CI95% Det. rate CI95% Det. rate CI95% Det. rate CI95% Det. rate CI95%
K(F0)
50 99.45 0.15 99.37 0.17 99.39 0.16 87.59 5.84 98.15 0.62
100 99.45 0.19 99.64 0.22 99.51 0.22 84.15 6.68 97.75 0.71
250 99.20 0.28 99.27 0.40 99.47 0.26 84.49 4.38 97.50 0.66
500 98.93 0.45 98.81 0.67 99.01 0.44 83.63 5.03 97.19 0.85
K(F1)
50 97.89 0.39 94.31 1.09 92.86 0.89 82.15 5.87 93.55 0.97
100 97.06 0.39 91.68 1.37 88.59 1.20 78.74 6.36 90.48 1.23
250 94.70 0.69 88.42 2.55 78.91 1.93 74.18 8.23 84.34 1.65
500 91.59 1.48 84.20 4.11 64.00 3.34 71.37 8.87 76.03 2.26
K(F2)
50 97.94 0.37 94.28 1.10 92.89 0.89 82.21 5.91 93.58 0.99
100 97.33 0.35 91.71 1.36 88.53 1.36 78.21 6.85 90.30 1.28
250 94.82 0.66 88.37 2.55 78.65 1.87 73.91 8.48 84.19 1.49
500 91.73 1.73 84.13 4.15 64.64 3.41 71.16 9.01 76.40 2.53
TABLE I
DETECTION RATE.
Normal Dropping Delaying Wormhole Any misbehavior
Window size[s] FP rate CI95% FP rate CI95% FP rate CI95% FP rate CI95% FP rate CI95%
K(F0)
50 1.04 0.33 0.39 0.13 0.78 0.17 4.35 1.67 0.94 0.23
100 1.30 0.41 0.11 0.08 0.61 0.26 5.04 1.81 0.88 0.28
250 1.48 0.39 0.34 0.30 0.49 0.33 8.32 3.04 1.44 0.62
500 1.72 0.57 0.74 0.77 0.62 0.44 9.81 3.75 1.77 0.66
K(F1)
50 3.73 0.57 3.46 0.73 5.47 0.77 8.12 2.61 3.63 0.54
100 5.59 0.84 4.52 0.98 8.60 0.86 9.55 3.35 5.10 0.53
250 9.02 0.97 6.46 1.99 15.61 2.18 16.86 5.91 9.41 1.19
500 13.74 1.63 10.57 3.36 25.96 3.05 19.85 6.95 15.29 1.76
K(F2)
50 3.71 0.57 3.44 0.71 5.28 0.76 8.23 2.60 3.55 0.52
100 5.68 0.86 4.40 0.99 8.38 0.91 6.69 2.12 4.65 0.44
250 9.11 0.94 6.22 1.85 15.38 2.06 16.05 5.91 9.28 1.25
500 13.54 1.81 11.08 3.73 25.24 3.56 19.81 7.52 15.09 2.27
TABLE II
FALSE POSITIVES RATE.
B. Implications for Design of Autonomous Detection Systems
The results in Tables I, II and IV demonstrate the relative
strength of the used watchdog features. It is clear that they can
be used almost alone and their classification ability is better
than the combined classification ability of the features T1 L–
T5 L and T1 R–T5 R. Notice that according to Table IV only
the (local) f0 component in F0 is effectively used. From the
results it can be concluded that as the size of the time window
decreases, the classification ability of K(f0) and K(F2) will
11
(a) K(F0). Avg. sample size per node = 4,096.
Actual
1 2 3 4
Pr
ed
ic
te
d 1 51629 66 104 433
2 47 10927 6 1
3 88 5 15847 9
4 120 2 2 2990
(b) K(F2). Avg. sample size per node = 3,789.
Actual
1 2 3 4
Pr
ed
ic
te
d 1 50794 565 1177 575
2 231 10285 138 8
3 658 139 14620 41
4 201 11 24 2809
TABLE III
CONFUSION MATRICES FOR (A) K(F0) AND (B) K(F2). WINDOW SIZE =
50 SECONDS. 1=NORMAL, 2=DROPPING, 3=DELAYING, 4=WORMHOLE.
500s 50s
Feature Id F0 F2 F0 F2
M3 L 0.80 0.95
M4 L 0.95 1.00
M5 L 0.25
M6 L 0.45
R5 L 0.30 0.55
R9 L 0.60 0.40 0.85 1.00
R11 L 0.25 0.35
R12 L 0.40
T1 L 0.65 0.60
T2 L 0.25
T3 L 0.45 0.25 0.70
T4 L 0.25 0.25
T5 L 0.30 0.35 0.50
M6 R 0.30
R9 R 0.30 0.35
R11 R 0.40
R12 R 0.25 0.25
T1 R 0.80 0.70
T2 R 0.30
T3 R 0.30 0.95
T4 R 0.35
T5 R 0.65 0.50
TABLE IV
FEATURE WEIGHTS. WINDOW SIZE={500S, 50S}. A BLANK FIELD MEANS
THAT EITHER THE FEATURE DOES NOT BELONG TO THE FEATURE SET OR
ITS VALUE WAS < 0.25.
equalize. That is:
lim
win. size→0
class. errorΩ(K(F2)) ≈ class. error
Ω(K(f0))
(15)
Eq. 15 characterizes the relationship between watchdog and
F2 based misbehavior detection. It points out that instead of
observing each data packet’s delivery in promiscuous mode
by the node si, it can be equally well done in a cooperative
way by si and si+2, if win. size→ 0.
In other words, if the time window is small enough that it
always includes only a single event, the relationship between
the events at si and si+2 becomes explicit, i.e. a data packet
received at si+2 can be unambiguously matched with a data
packet forwarded by one of its two-hop neighbors. Decreasing
the time window size is however connected with a high
communication cost (each packet arrival at si+2 is explicitely
reported to si). For f0 based misbehavior detection, this
relationship is straightforward since si only evaluates data
packets that it just sent.
In terms of learning complexity, the fundamental differences
in these two approaches are:
• If using f0, the send-overhear relationship is always
explicit since si can directly observe the forwarding of
the data packet that it just sent to si+1. Therefore, the
classification task is straightforward.
• If using F2 with win. size ≫ 0, learning based on
data traffic at both si and si+2 must be done. Feature
averaging over a time window increases the classification
task complexity.
The above two observations and Eq. 15 offer a rough
characterization of the trade-offs between detection approaches
executed by a single node and by several nodes in cooperation.
C. Co-stimulation Based Misbehavior Detection
The rule formulated in Eq. 15 motivates the following
strategy: approximate K(f0) with K(F2). If the K(F2) based
classification hints a possibility of misbehavior then employ
K(f0) to get a more reliable prediction. There are two basic
reasons for applying this strategy: (i) computing F2 is more
energy efficient and (ii) it allows for an energy efficient
implementation of the co-stimulation approach presented in
Alg. 1.
The results achieved by co-stimulation are reported in
Tables V and VI. The classification performance evaluation of
K(F2), K(f0) and K(F2)→ K(f0) is based on three separate
cross-validation experiments. It can be seen that for the four
considered time windows sizes, K(F2) and K(f0) fulfill the
condition formulated in Eq. 6. The reported performance,
taking into consideration the corresponding CI95%, is also in-
line with Eqs. 11 and 13. Most notably, it can be seen that
except for wormholes, the following holds:
FP rateΩcj (K(F2)→ K(f0))
∼= FP rateΩcjK(f0) (16)
The results show that for win. size = 50s, 18.2% and
13.3% wormholes were misclassified as belonging to the “nor-
mal” class, when K(F2) and K(f0) were applied, respectively.
These two factors contributed to this result: (i) a wormhole
start node can appear to “lose” a variable number of data
packets depending on the wormhole utilization in a given time
window , and (ii) the used features were not sufficient for this
type of misbehavior.
D. Analysis of Co-stimulation Energy Efficiency
The rationale for applying co-stimulation rests on its ability
to stimulate energy efficiency. Let us now therefore formulate
an energy model for co-stimulation.
Unlike when K(f0) gets exclusively applied, in our ap-
proach K(f0) will get used only if (i) a true positive was
detected by K(F2) or (ii) a false positive was mistakenly
detected by K(F2). This means, for a misbehavior free ad hoc
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Dropping Delaying Wormhole Any misbehavior
Win. size[s] Det. rate CI95% Det. rate CI95% Det. rate CI95% Det. rate CI95%
K(F2)
50 94.28 1.10 92.89 0.89 82.21 5.91 93.58 0.99
100 91.71 1.36 88.53 1.36 78.21 6.85 90.30 1.28
250 88.37 2.55 78.65 1.87 73.91 8.48 84.19 1.49
500 84.13 4.15 64.64 3.41 71.16 9.01 76.40 2.53
K(f0)
50 99.37 0.17 99.39 0.16 87.59 5.84 98.15 0.62
100 99.64 0.22 99.51 0.22 84.15 6.68 97.75 0.71
250 99.27 0.40 99.47 0.26 84.49 4.38 97.50 0.66
500 98.81 0.67 99.01 0.44 83.63 5.03 97.19 0.85
Co-stimulation: K(F2) → K(f0)
50 95.02 0.92 93.62 0.87 81.00 6.24 93.42 0.72
100 93.53 1.17 89.39 1.51 75.06 7.35 90.00 0.84
250 89.68 2.06 79.47 1.82 71.09 8.22 84.70 1.06
500 85.82 3.81 68.99 3.47 69.38 9.50 78.89 1.71
TABLE V
CO-STIMULATION PERFORMANCE: DETECTION RATE.
Dropping Delaying Wormhole Any misbehavior
Win. size[s] FP rate CI95% FP rate CI95% FP rate CI95% FP rate CI95%
K(F2)
50 3.44 0.71 5.28 0.76 8.23 2.60 3.55 0.52
100 4.40 0.99 8.38 0.91 6.69 2.12 4.65 0.44
250 6.22 1.85 15.38 2.06 16.05 5.91 9.28 1.25
500 11.08 3.73 25.24 3.56 19.81 7.52 15.09 2.27
K(f0)
50 0.39 0.13 0.78 0.17 4.35 1.67 0.94 0.23
100 0.11 0.08 0.61 0.26 5.04 1.81 0.88 0.28
250 0.34 0.30 0.49 0.33 8.32 3.04 1.44 0.62
500 0.74 0.77 0.62 0.44 9.81 3.75 1.77 0.66
Co-stimulation: K(F2) → K(f0)
50 0.48 0.14 0.45 0.17 3.25 1.51 0.98 1.36
100 0.38 0.19 0.31 0.16 5.14 2.41 1.26 1.75
250 0.97 0.54 0.40 0.21 3.54 1.21 1.28 1.73
500 1.19 0.70 0.44 0.28 4.64 2.13 1.67 2.59
TABLE VI
CO-STIMULATION PERFORMANCE: FP RATE.
network, the energy saving over an exclusive K(f0) approach
is related to FP rateΩcj (K(F2)). We focus on the energy
efficiency analysis in a misbehavior free ad hoc network, since
it is reasonable to assume that an ad hoc network will work
reliably, most of the time.
With respect to the above said, we assume the following
energy model for co-stimulation in a misbehavior free ad hoc
network:
ξ(n) = ξF2 + FP rate
Ω
cj
(K(F2))× ξf0(n) (17)
where n is the number of data packets that need to be
overheard by si in promiscuous mode for the purpose of f0
based classification. ξ(n) is the total energy consumption after
co-stimulation in a time window of the length win. size,
ξF2 is the energy consumption related to the computation
of F2 and ξf0 (n) is the energy consumption related to the
computation of f0. In the following, we also assume that cj =
“any misbehavior”. Additionally, we assume that decision tree
query costs are negligible, if compared to feature computation
costs that are dominated by the communication costs.
The choice of n depends on the expected data traffic pattern
as well as the type of misbehavior. With respect to our
experimental setup, we assume that K(f0) is based on a 50-
second time window size. Note that if si+1 forwards data
packets for a single connection then n = 0.5 × win. size
under our data traffic model, i.e. we consider n = 25.
Energy Consumption Analysis: Feeney and Nilsson inves-
tigated in [26] the energy consumption of a Lucent 2Mbps
IEEE802.11 wireless card. They concluded that energy con-
sumption can be modeled as a× size+ b, where size is the
data packet size in bytes. The constants a and b reflect the
consumption in µJ when sending (a = 1.9, b = 454), receiv-
ing (a = 0.5, b = 356) or overhearing (a = 0.39, b = 140) a
data packet. This translates into the following energy models
for K(f0) and K(F2), respectively:
ξf0(n) = n× (0.39× size(data) + 140) (18)
ξF2 = 2× ((1.9× size(fˆ2) + 454)+ (0.5× size(fˆ2) + 356))
(19)
where size(data) is the data packet size in bytes and size(fˆ2)
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win. size FP rate [%] ξ(25) ξ′(25) γ(25) Det.rate [%] FP rate [%]
[s] K(F2) [mJ] [mJ] [%] K(F2) → K(f0) K(F2) → K(f0)
50 3.55 2.33 23.29 82.73 93.42 0.98
100 4.65 2.48 12.39 90.81 90.00 1.26
250 9.28 3.10 6.20 95.40 84.70 1.28
500 15.09 3.89 3.89 97.12 78.89 1.67
TABLE VII
CO-STIMULATION: ENERGY CONSUMPTION AND MISBEHAVIOR DETECTION PERFORMANCE.
is the size of the data packet carrying fˆ si+22 in bytes. Eq. 18
reflects the fact that in promiscuous mode the energy consump-
tion grows linearly with the number of data packets overheard.
Eq. 19 reflects the cost of sending fˆ si+22 over two hops to si.
The results for energy efficiency using co-stimulation are
shown in Table VII. We applied the following parameters:
size(data) = 1kB and size(fˆ2) = 48B + size(header)
(corresponding to 24 features, 2 bytes reserved for each
feature; size(header) = 0, if fˆ si+22 is transported using
piggybacking). ξ′(n) and γ(n) are defined as follows:
ξ′(n) =
500.0
win. size
× ξ(n) γ(n) = 1.0−
ξ′(n)
ξf0(250)
(20)
ξ′(n) is the adjusted energy consumption for a 500-second
time period. γ(n) is the energy saving relative to ξf0(250), i.e.
relative to the energy consumption of f0 based classification
in a 500-second time window:
Inspecting Table VII, it can be seen that under our exper-
imental setup co-stimulation can save up to 97.12% energy.
It can also be seen that co-stimulation offers a possibility to
choose a trade-off between energy consumption and detection
performance. This can be seen by comparing γ(25) and the
right-hand side of Table VII, where the classification results
for the “any misbehavior” class are shown.
In Fig 4(a), the accumulated energy consumption using 500-
second time windows is shown. It can be seen that after 60
minutes of operation, the energy saving in a misbehavior free
ad hoc wireless network for the data packet size of 1kB is
nearly two orders of magnitude. For a smaller data packet
size of 64 bytes, more typical for wireless sensor networks, the
energy saving is more than one order of magnitude. In Fig 4(b)
the dependence of energy consumption on FP rate (F2) is
shown.
By solving ξf0(n) = ξF2 , we can show that ξF2 < ξf0(n),
if n > 3.43, i.e. the condition formulated in Eq. 5 is satisfied
for a reasonable time window size.
E. Further Discussion of Results
We restricted ourselves to three basic types of misbehav-
ior. Our goal was to investigate one representative from the
qualitative group of misbehavior types (packet dropping), one
from the quantitate group (packet delaying) and one from the
topology group (wormholes). Many types of misbehavior can
be classified within these three groups. For example, a data
packet manipulation attempt falls within the qualitative group
since it can be detected by monitoring the data packet size
and/or correction code, learning the usual manipulation rate
(due to e.g. a routing protocol) and subsequent classification.
Our approach to misbehavior detection can be considered
very general. It is well known that some types of misbehavior
can be efficiently detected, if for example time synchronization
or GPS (Global Positioning System) information is available;
see e.g. results on packet leashes for wormhole detection
due to Hu et al. [32]. Such specialized capabilities would
however interfere with our intention to contrast implications
of a non-cooperative versus cooperative detection (K(f0) vs
co-stimulation based misbehavior detection).
The results presented in Tables I, II and V offer a good
performance guidance for detection systems that aim at prof-
iting from traffic measurements in the neighborhood of a
misbehaving node. Even though misbehavior detection can
be also done by an independent third-party node that is not
lying on the given connection but that can easily overhear the
transmission, its observations with respect to the misbehaving
node are not going to be more precise than the combined
information from nodes si and si+2. Such a scenario also
implicates a continuous operation in promiscuous mode. In
addition to energy inefficiency, operation in promiscuous mode
increases vulnerability to intrusions since once a data packet
gets intercepted and (temporarily) stored in the memory, it
allows for an application of the techniques described in [4].
This can lead to execution of the code carried in the packet’s
data portion. Unlike in usual packet forwarding, (i) such a
scenario would simplify choosing a specific victim and (ii)
it would be harder to detect because other nodes might be
unaware of the fact that this node was able to overhear the
transmission.
We concentrated on features that can be computed without
much computational overhead. Our results could have been
somewhat different if a more complex Fourier or wavelets
analysis of the packet stream had been done. As the results by
Barford et al. point out [34], this could lead to good anomaly
detection rates.
The classification in our setup is done on a single time
window basis. This has a certain energy efficiency effect as
a post-processing phase (statistical analysis, clustering) can
be avoided. This positively impacts the time to detect a
misbehavior.
The BIS is an inherently distributed system with function-
ality that can be very hard to mimic. For example, the success
of the negative selection, a learning mechanism applied in
training and priming of T-cells in the thymus, rests on the
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Fig. 4. Energy consumption.
efficiency of the blood-thymic barrier that guarantees that
the thymus stays pathogen free at all times. This implies
that T-cells being trained in the thymus never encounter any
type of pathogen before released into the body. This helps
tremendously in detecting foreign cells. Mapping functionality
of the BIS to a computational paradigm is a hot topic within
the AIS community. Our goal was to concentrate on the
simplest mechanisms. Most notably, we were motivated by
the interplay between the innate and adaptive immune system.
The mechanisms of the innate immune system bear a certain
resemblance to the F0 based classification approach. The
innate system is for example very efficient in signaling tissue
injury or damage to the adaptive immune system. This ability,
as pointed out before, has been induced over the evolutionary
time but is based on some very rudimentary methods such as
recognizing an unusually high level of dead or damaged self
cells (e.g. blood cells). This can be directly compared with the
very straightforward functionality of watchdogs. Similarly, the
more machine learning extensive classification approach based
on F2 can be, in our opinion, compared with the adaptive
immune system.
X. CONCLUSIONS
We presented and experimentally evaluated a novel
immuno-inspired energy efficient approach to misbehavior
detection in ad hoc wireless networks. We demonstrated that
under our experimental setup, the (communication related)
energy saving for 1kB data packets, if compared to watchdog
monitoring, is nearly two orders of magnitude. For smaller
data packets of 64 bytes, more typical for wireless sensor
networks, the energy saving is above one order of magnitude.
We achieved a good control of the false positives rate. This
is important in order to reduce the maintenance costs of ad hoc
networks. We also showed that our co-stimulation approach
becomes cheaper than its watchdog based counterpart at a time
window size of 6.86 second.
We demonstrated a relationship between the energy ef-
ficiency and detection performance. This approach can be
thus used to find a trade-off between misbehavior detection
performance and energy efficiency.
We applied three different node misbehavior models: data
packet dropping, data packet delaying and wormholes. A
wormhole can only be formed if two nodes closely cooperate,
i.e. it is an instance of misbehavior done in collusion.
We would like to note that our results are independent
from the global network topology, since in our approach we
only looked at a two-hop segment of a connection. Since we
evaluated the performance at 20 distinct nodes with different
node degrees, our results provide a robust estimate of the
expected performance.
Motivated by the results presented herein, Drozda et al.
investigated an error propagation algorithm [35] that takes
advantage of Eq. 15 in order to induce systemic resistance
against misbehavior. It also removes the reliance on a labeled
dataset for learning the normal behavior and misbehavior.
The datasets used in our experiments are available for
download [36].
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